

The Resistance

The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement

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Mobilizing for Immigrant and Latino Rights under Trump

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On the heels of the historic 2006 immigrant rights protest wave, the US immigrant rights movement and Latino voters were part of the coalition that helped defeat a nativist Republican Party in two consecutive presidential elections (Barreto and Segura 2014; Zepeda-Millán 2017). Accordingly, when, in 2015, Donald Trump decided to run for president by “starting off his campaign calling Mexican immigrants rapists and criminals,” he “sent shockwaves through the immigrant community and the immigrant rights movement.”¹ Since then, no other segment of the Resistance has been targeted as openly, directly, or as often by the president as the Latino immigrant community. Among other attacks, Trump has signed executive actions targeting them, promised to build a border wall to keep them out, pardoned a sheriff convicted of racially profiling them, and ended a popular program that legalized hundreds of thousands of undocumented youth²—all actions that negatively and disproportionately affected the Latino community and the nation’s immigrant rights movement.

Given that President Trump’s assaults against Latino immigrants show no signs of abating a year into his presidency, in this chapter we examine some of the ways the 2016 presidential election has impacted immigrant rights activism. In addition, because nativist actions in this country have a disparate effect on both US- and foreign-born Latinos (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Chavez 2008; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Sampaio 2015), we pay particular attention to this community’s current support for contentious politics on behalf of the foreign born. However, as the other chapters in this book illustrate, because Latino immigrants have not been the only group targeted by the Trump administration, we also assess the degree to which Latinos support the activism of other segments of the Resistance, specifically the Black Lives Matter and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) movements.

In the first two parts of our chapter, we draw on a series of personal interviews we have carried out with activists in the immigrant rights community. In the third part, we draw on survey evidence to reflect on the actual and the potential participation of Latinos in the Resistance. In the fourth part, we address a question that lies at the heart of this book: that of the Latino movement’s potential role in the broader Resistance through both intersectionality and cross-movement connections between Latinos and other sectors of the movement.

In line with Goldstone and Tilly’s landmark article (2001), we find that threats and opportunities can coincide and “combine to shape contentious action” (181) in different ways and at different levels. On the one hand, the immigrant rights movement has been put on the defensive by having to operate under a context of increased threats and limited political opportunities at the national level. On the other hand, in some cities and states, activists are taking advantage of an unexpected opening of opportunities that, in many respects, are greater than those found under the previous Democratic administration. In locales where organizers are operating in an environment of high levels of threat and closed political opportunity structures the immigrant rights movement seems to be in a state of “abeyance” (Taylor 1989) in which activists are focusing their efforts on less-overt forms of political action, such as base-building and base-movement strengthening. But in some other cities and states—like much of California—the movement has found surprising resonance as activists of all kinds rally to the cause of the so-called “Dreamers” and support what has become a vigorous “sanctuary” movement.

Fighting for Immigrant Rights Under Trump

Almost no one thought that Donald Trump would become president of the United States. On June 16, 2015, when he announced his desire to be his party’s nominee, Reuters reported that “Republican strategists and officials cringed at the thought” of the reality TV star and real estate mogul “grabbing attention away from the party’s more serious candidates,” as it tried “to win back the White House after defeats in 2008 and 2012.”³ Even subsequent to surprising everyone by winning the Republican primaries, few believed that such an outlandish and openly racist candidate could have a chance of succeeding our nation’s first—and twice-elected—African American president. Indeed, just days before Americans went to the polls to cast their ballots in November 2016, the popular survey website *FiveThirtyEight* reported, “Top public election pollsters are almost unanimous in their belief that Hillary Clinton will be the next president.”⁴ Political forecasters had “put Clinton’s chance of winning at anywhere from 70% to as high as 99%.”⁵ Yet, “When Election Day dawned,” although “almost all the

pollsters, analytics nerds and political insiders in the country had Hilary Clinton waltzing into the White House," *Politico* noted that, "By the time polls had closed nationwide on Tuesday night, those projections had been left in shambles."⁶

Dashed Hopes, Devastating Realities

Trump's victory was particularly devastating for the immigrant rights movement in general and for Latino activists in particular. Not only had an openly anti-immigrant and anti-Latino candidate just won the White House, but news headlines had also projected Latinos would have played a central role in Trump's expected electoral defeat. For instance, leading up to Election Day, national media outlets proclaimed that, "Early voting by Latinos may help Clinton in several states,"⁷ that a "Latino voting surge" was rattling the "Trump campaign,"⁸ and that "Latino support for Clinton" was "set to hit a record high for a presidential candidate."⁹ Thus, if Hillary had been victorious, political pundits would have undoubtedly boasted about the new electoral power of Latinos and how Trump's defeat was a national referendum against racist nativism. As Laurence Benenson of the National Immigration Forum, a centrist immigration policy coalition, put it, "Had Clinton won, as most of us expected, I think a lot of the narrative would have been that the position Trump took on immigration was the primary reason" he lost.

Immigrant rights advocates had anticipated making major gains under a Hillary Clinton presidency. According to several national movement leaders, they were preparing to push for a host of progressive legislative changes, given the fact that, from the start of her campaign, Clinton had promised to use her administrative authority as president to enact pro-immigrant policies. Chris Newman of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) explained,

We were ready to try to get whistle blower visas for immigrant victims of workplace rights violations. Some people thought a version of CIR [comprehensive immigration reform] was possible. Some people thought smaller bills were possible and that expanding deferred action was going to be possible. A further rolling back of Secure Communities was possible, winning the Texas vs. U.S.-DAPA [Supreme Court] case was possible, the list goes on and on and on.

Another activist added, "You probably would have also seen advocates pressing her on some of Obama's policies that weren't popular, like some of his family detention policies and some of his administration's work with private prisons."¹⁰ The chances of any of these goals being accomplished were crushed as a result of

Clinton's electoral defeat. Consequently, the general feeling among movement interviewees was that, "Today, under a Trump administration, passing any national legislation is a pipe-dream."¹¹

Notwithstanding Obama's stringent interior immigration enforcement measures (Gonzales 2014; Macias-Rojas 2016), the national immigrant rights leaders we interviewed for this chapter asserted that under a Democratic president, at a minimum, they would have "had a seat at the table." As one organizer described it, "Despite the fact that it deported hundreds of thousands of people," in response to their protests the Obama administration "would at least open the door to the immigrant rights movement to have conversations about the administration's practices and to make sure that they were held accountable."¹² Whereas now, another activists clarified, "the groups that the Trump people reach out to are those more aligned with his campaign, which are outwardly hostile" toward the immigrant community and the immigrant rights movement.¹³

Summing up the overall impacts of the election on the movement's national policy goals, one activist admitted,

Almost all of our plans were changed because no one had anticipated the possibility that Trump would win. The shift that occurred overnight was that we went from all kinds of incredibly ambitious things we thought were going to be possible at the federal level, legislatively, administratively, and even through the courts, to after the election feeling that nothing is possible at the federal level.¹⁴

As another pro-immigrant national policy leader expounded, "From an advocacy standpoint, it's a different world we're in than just a couple years ago. Now we're playing a lot more defense on all sorts of different fronts."¹⁵

Widespread Fear, Ineffective Tactics

Although after a year of his presidency Donald Trump had suffered a string of administrative and policy defeats and had only one legislative victory to his name—the tax bill—he did keep his promise to aggressively attack immigrants. Upon taking office, on top of explicitly targeting places where the immigrant rights movement had successfully helped pass local "sanctuary city" ordinances, the new president increased arrests of undocumented people across the country by close to 40%.¹⁶ What is more, going beyond the Obama administration's record number of expulsions, his "White House issued clear policy memos that directed ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] agents to prioritize criminals when sifting through the mountains of files of people facing

deportation." But according to *Newsweek*, Trump "effectively overturned Obama's policy" by directing immigration officers to go after and deport any undocumented person they come across, even for minor violations.¹⁷ As the *Miami Herald* put it, "The big accomplishment of Trump's first 100 days" in office was his "Terrorizing [of] undocumented immigrants."¹⁸

This "terrorizing" has had a chilling effect on the immigrant rights movement. According to activists, although there had been fear of deportation under Obama, after Trump's election those anxieties increased exponentially. Mario Carrillo of America's Voice explained, "There's been a considerable uptick of deportations among people without any criminal record," which "has certainly led to a lot of confusion and a lot of fear and a lot of panic" because of "not knowing how the administration will come down on any given day."¹⁹ Laurence Benenson of the National Immigration Forum pointed out that, "People think, with good reason, that they're at risk of getting swept up and them or their loved ones being deported. There's always been some sense of fear but it's gotten much more extensive since January," when Trump took office.

Elizabeth Cuna of United We Dream (UWD), the leading cross-country network of undocumented youth, agreed, adding that many Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients who are in college or have jobs are now "scared of losing everything" they've worked so hard to accomplish. These fears, however, aren't limited to young activists. As another organizer described, "I think there was a time when parents of undocumented youth started shedding the fear that was associated with being undocumented." Under the Obama administration, "They saw their kids being able to come out and express in public who they were" and, as a result, began to have the desire to do the same. But now, according to the activist, when they try to hold public events, "the vast majority" of undocumented youth they work with "say that if there's going to be media involved, their parents will not come out and try to defy this administration by being so outspoken about their status."²⁰

Contentious politics scholars have long asserted that the opening of political opportunity structures, which include the presence of sympathetic allies in key positions of power, are crucial for the success of social movements (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011). In this respect, it is important to note that, for the most part, the undocumented youth movement emerged and reached its peak accomplishments during the Obama administration (Nicholls 2013). Unfortunately, today, as one activist argued, "there's a lot more risk and a lot more at stake when DACA recipients and Dreamers decide to go through with acts of civil disobedience."²¹ Despite the fact that there are still a number of activists willing to protest against the Trump administration, a UWD organizer explained, "there's a huge amount of youth who think it's crazy to risk getting arrested and deported now."²²

Chris Newman of NDLOJ shared a concrete illustration of the difficulties of fighting for immigrant rights under Trump. He said, "The great innovation that occurred during the Obama administration was organizing to stop individual deportations, which then had an upward impact on administrative policies." Regrettably, Newman lamented, "None of the old strategies and tactics of shaming the administration in order to compel administrative reforms work anymore" (see Patler and Gonzales 2015). He confessed that "no one has figured out how to organize and stop a deportation yet," and held that "the idea of left-side pressure as a tactic no longer works."

Operating in a political environment in which the federal government is overtly threatening their social movement and constituencies has had an especially adverse impact on the younger generation of immigrant rights activists. As Newman noted, "A lot of the younger folks don't know what it's like to do advocacy under a Republican administration, much less the type of Republican administration we have now." The "recently woke crowd who are super hip to things like the deserving and undeserving immigrant dichotomy and intersectionality, and who formed these intellectual insights under the Obama administration, don't have the intellectual or tactical considerations for the world we're in right now." As a result, "we're left with much more ambitious intellectual aspirations but a complete brick wall in terms of what can be done . . . It's f****g bleak, like really bleak, there's no point in sugarcoating it."²³ Carrillo of America's Voice concurred and declared, "We're dealing with something completely different, something completely hostile compared to the previous administration." Consequently, "we're doing a lot of soul searching now about what advocacy looks like in the time of Trump, and I don't think moving forward it will look the same" as it did in the past.

Responding to the Now; Building for the Future

There is a consensus among activists on the need to immediately resist and respond to the Trump administration's attacks in an attempt to limit, as much as possible, the negative ramifications of the president's actions. However, although all of the national advocates we interviewed were "on high alert" and "on the defensive," depending on their specific foci, constituencies, and local political dynamics, different segments of the movement are responding differently to what they think is achievable "in the time of Trump."

For instance, in addition to publicly stating their opposition to the president's anti-immigrant actions, some of the more politically moderate groups in the movement are trying to identify policies that may not be as partisan as

comprehensive immigration reform and can, they hope, possibly lay the foundation for more expansive legislative discussions in the future. As an example, the National Immigration Forum is a coalition of faith leaders, law enforcement agents, and members of the business community—or, as they put it, “Bibles, Badges, and Businesses”—who are supportive of comprehensive immigration reform. Whereas their religious partners have been worried about the moral implications of Trump’s policies, their law enforcement members have reported that immigrant communities are rapidly losing trust in local police officers, which makes it harder for the police to do their jobs.

Moreover, the coalition’s business partners are concerned about the new administration’s plans to cut legal immigration, which they believe would have an extremely negative effect on their labor force needs and on the general economy. Nonetheless, one of the organization’s main policy strategies at the moment is trying to push for what its leaders call “skills and workforce issues,” which include things like “jobs training, vocational, and language skills training” for immigrants. They believe that these “are areas that are less controversial” and that “you don’t have the parties fighting with each other.” Their hopes are that if they “get some traction on these policies, maybe it could open some doors with members of the administration for what we think of as more general immigration policies.”²⁴

Shifting Scale Downward

Writing about the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam pointed out that cycles of contention frequently shift upward as they diffuse, a move that can offer new targets, different tactics, and greater threats and opportunities (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). What Tarrow and McAdam failed to investigate, however, was that when opportunities close at the national level, movements often shift their attention downward, closer to the grassroots, where there may be opportunities that are closed off at the national level. This was the case for the immigrant rights movement after 2006.

But there is a complication in shifting a movement’s scale downward: as Edelina Burciaga and Lisa Martinez have argued, the opportunity structure for the immigrant rights movement—like much else in American politics—varies from place to place (2017). From data collected between 2006 and 2011, Burciaga and Martinez argue that “contexts of varying levels of antagonism or accommodation . . . shape both the emergence and character of undocumented youth movements” (Burciaga and Martinez 2017: 452). In Los Angeles, activists took advantage of California’s generally welcoming context for undocumented immigrants; for example, the state has offered in-state tuition and financial aid

at public colleges since 2001 and financial aid to students since 2013 (Burciaga and Martinez 2017: 458). This helped to shape a new “socially acceptable identity” and invigorated activists “to continue to push for state-level changes within a rapidly shifting and unstable federal context” (460).

In contrast, in antagonistic contexts like Atlanta, Georgia, undocumented youth were on the defensive after 2006, mobilizing to oppose a ban barring them from accessing institutions of higher education and focusing on students, rather than on the broader issue of immigrant rights. In summary, America’s variegated political landscape has generated different degrees of activism and different strategies on the undocumented youth movement, influencing “the claims they made, the target of their claims, and the strategies and tactics they employed in each city” (Burciaga and Martinez 2017: 466).

In our research, we found that although the more progressive and grassroots groups in the movement do not believe that even minimal national legislative gains are possible under Trump, they are shifting scale downward—concentrating their efforts on building local power and expanding their membership bases. As Cuna of UWD explained,

The truth is that when we started in the movement we took advantage of the political moment that existed [under Obama] But the reality is that we didn’t have a 10-year strategy of how we would sustain and cultivate our youth leadership, or how we would retain the distinct generations that entered our movement This has definitely changed. Today we know we have to deal with the urgent issues that come up, but we also need a long-term strategy that includes us maintaining strength in the places where we already have a presence, but also includes more rural places and new places.

She continued, “The tactic of growing our membership in locations where Trump won is essential now. We realized we’re not changing the narratives and local policies in these places, so right now our focus is on cultivating as much local power as possible.” Cuna illustrated, “If there’s a school board election in these places, if there’s a mayoral election, whatever it is, our focus now is on local elections and influence because that’s the only way we could” continue to build our movement “over the next ten years.” Thus, in response to the results of the 2016 presidential race, UWD has renewed their efforts to target specific districts in Texas, New Mexico, and Florida, where they are “running civic engagement programs” in which they are attempting to influence local candidates’ platforms, doing educational phone-banking, canvassing, and even plan to eventually “cultivate” their immigrant youth “leadership to run for school board, for city council, etc.”

Chris Newman of NDLOM also put forward the idea of having the “dual goal” of “on the one hand, having meaningful interventions that help people on immediate stuff like self-defense, preparing for more scapegoating, criminalization, and attacks on our institutions.” On the other hand, he elaborated, “we have to also try to build a more longer-term” political agenda, which includes taking advantage of the opportunities that have arisen in some more politically progressive locations. For example, “California is the one place where the inverse of the political dynamic of what occurred in D.C. took place.” In the Golden State, Trump’s electoral victory “created all these weird dynamics where left-side politicians are feeling more incentivized to show their pro-immigrant credentials.” According to Newman, local California politicians are now willing to take public stances they were unwilling to adopt under the Obama administration. This seems to be especially true among Latino elected officials.

For instance, similar to the vital role lawyers played in challenging Trump’s discriminatory travel ban (see Dorf and Chu’s chapter in this volume, Chapter 6), California’s Latino attorney general, former Los Angeles Congressman Xavier Becerra, has taken the lead in suing to stop the president from building his controversial border wall with Mexico and over his plan to end the popular DACA program, which “protects young immigrants from deportation.”²⁵ California legislators’ recent passage of a “sanctuary state” bill “to protect immigrants without legal residency in the U.S.” is another example. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, this law was “part of a broader push by Democrats” in the state “to counter expanded deportation orders under the Trump administration.”²⁶ Newman believes that Latino State Senator Kevin de Leon, the legislator who led the efforts to pass the new law, “wouldn’t have run a bill that was antagonizing to the Clinton administration.” He recalled that “in the shock and awe moment of Trump winning and facing the reality of it,” de Leon contacted several immigrant rights organizations across the state and “said every idea that we’ve rejected as politically unfeasible for the last 8 years because Barack Obama was president, we want all of those ideas back on the table so that we could maximize every possible thing we could do under California law to protect immigrants.” Hence, at least in some locations, it seems that elected officials—particularly Latino ones—are seeing the current moment as one in which it may be politically expedient to work with movement activists on passing progressive immigration policies at the local level.

That said, it shouldn’t surprise us that in a state where Latino elected officials wield considerable political influence, “California has become a model” for liberal immigration legislation.

These dynamics, of course, are premised on the fact that Latino politicians find it politically beneficial to flaunt their “pro-immigrant credentials” to their pro-immigrant Latino voting bases. But why would both Latino elected officials

and immigrant rights activists believe they could count on the backing of the Latino electorate? Part of the reason is simply because Latinos are disproportionately impacted by immigration issues because the vast majority of them are either foreign born themselves or “are children, spouses, in-laws, and neighbors” of immigrants (Pedraza, Segura, and Bowler 2011: 2).

In addition, as Cuna of UWD bluntly stated, “At the end of the day, over 70% of the 11 million undocumented immigrants are Latino, that’s the demographic reality.” But although most people without papers are in fact Latino, not all Latinos are immigrants, let alone undocumented ones. There is another key factor explaining why this community would be especially supportive of immigrant rights today. According to Newman of NDLOM, because of Trump, “There’s been an unmasking of the institutional white supremacy involved in the evolution of U.S. immigration policies.” As a result, “Now there’s an opportunity to talk about how immigration policies are both racist and racializing,” especially toward Latinos—US and foreign born. This matters politically because, as a representative of the National Immigration Forum explained, demographically “you have growing Latino populations that are building up electoral strength” across the country, and “I think that in the medium term its gonna really hurt the Republican Party.” He added, “Texas and Arizona are seen as red states right now, but if you look at their demographics and this administration’s rhetoric and policies, they could be like California after 1994 with Prop. 187.”²⁷

In sum, in response to a president as adverse to their movement as Trump is, some immigrant rights activists have taken to base-building and expanding their membership to new locations, especially in places that helped put Trump in office. In addition, at least some elected officials in liberal states seem emboldened by Trump’s anti-Latino and anti-immigrant rhetoric and are more willing to push for local policies they were hesitant to pursue under a Democratic president. In other words, Trump’s draconian attacks against immigrants have created local opportunities in some progressive locations where activists could take advantage of Democratic lawmakers’ new willingness to publicly oppose and defy the White House. Consequently, some organizers are capitalizing on the political moment in these locales by pushing for policies that can help protect immigrants from the federal government and expand their rights at the local and state levels.

Nonetheless, although these long-term goals are undoubtedly essential to the future of the nation’s immigrant rights movement, and despite the limits of using contentious politics to help pass liberal immigration policies under this administration, all of the national advocates we spoke to for this study agreed on the need to publicly protest against Trump’s actions. As such, because issues related to immigration in the United States have been racialized as distinctively Latino, and because this community is increasingly influential in

national politics, it is essential for us to explore the degree to which Latinos currently support not only immigrant rights, but also other types of activism given the diversity of movements that comprise the Resistance against President Donald Trump.

Latino Support for Political Activism

Thus far, we have used our interview data to map the contours of the struggle for immigrant rights in the Trump Era. We have focused on how movement strategies have shifted and have been redirected from the national to local levels and on the unique role Latinos play in the US immigrant rights movement. We now turn to an examination of current Latino support for various types of activism. We do this for several reasons. First, because of the numerous ways contentious politics can impact policymaking (Gillion 2013), we believe it is also important to investigate if Latinos today are supportive of immigrant rights and other high-profile types of activism. Second, in the current political climate under the Trump administration, multiple groups feel under attack from rhetoric, policies, and laws targeting them. Accordingly, by taking the pulse of Latino support for contentious politics across a range of topics in 2016, we can draw inferences about whether they see activism as a vehicle for political change, as well as the potential for other social movements in the Resistance to seek their backing.

To investigate Latino support for political activism, we drew upon the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (Barreto et al. 2017).²⁸ In this collaborative survey, researchers from various institutions designed their own questions and then purchased time on the instrument to field their survey items. The poll was fielded between mid November 2016 and February 2017. Similar to most observational research, our survey data provide a snapshot of Latino support for activism in late 2016–early 2017.

We fielded a series of questions related to support for activism among the survey's sample of approximately 3,000 Latino respondents and utilize several of these items for our analysis in this chapter. The survey also included a battery of various common sociodemographic variables, including political party affiliation, nativity, citizenship, and national origin group. Specifically, in three separate questions we asked respondents how much they support or oppose immigrant rights and LGB activism,²⁹ as well as the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Respondents were presented with the following answer choices: "Strongly Support," "Somewhat Support," "Neither Support nor Oppose," "Somewhat Oppose," and "Strongly Oppose." We intentionally asked about activism beyond immigrant rights because we suspected Latinos would be most supportive of




Figure 4.1 Latino Support for Activism.

Source: CMPS 2016.

contentious politics on behalf of the foreign born, given the personal nature of immigration to the Latino community (Sanchez et al. 2015; Wallace 2012). The overall survey results demonstrate that Latinos overwhelmingly support political activism across all three issue areas. Figure 4.1 displays the raw percentages of levels of support and opposition for each movement. Opposition, either strongly or somewhat, in any of these areas is quite low in comparison with support. This provides strong evidence that Latinos have a considerable amount of faith in activism as a form of political expression.

Latinos have a long history of participating in protests, marches, and rallies in support of immigrant rights (Zepeda-Millán 2017). Immigration is also consistently ranked as a highly important and personal issue for Latinos (Casellas 2010; Sanchez et al. 2015; Wallace 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Latinos overwhelmingly back immigrant rights activism, with the majority (nearly 54%) indicating some level of support. Latino opposition to this type of activism is also quite minimal. Across the three issue areas we examine, Latinos expressed the lowest levels of opposition (less than 12%) to immigrant rights activism. In fact, even a third (32%) of Latino Republicans support contentious politics on behalf of immigrants, though nothing close to the amount of backing (59%) expressed by Latinos who do not identify with the GOP. With regard to nativity, we were also not surprised to find that, given the direct impact on their lives, foreign-born Latinos support immigrant rights activism at an even higher degree (63%) than Latinos born in the United States (50%). Hence, in the time of Trump, immigrant rights activists should find some comfort in knowing that

they continue to enjoy strong levels of support among members of their core constituencies, Latinos in general and Latino immigrants in particular.

The BLM began in 2013 as a call to mobilize against state-sanctioned violence toward African Americans (see Meyer and Tarrow's introductory chapter).³⁰ Since then, the movement has broadened its scope to include a larger push to end antiblack racism and for black people to obtain equal social, political, and economic power (Taylor 2016). Although Latinos and African Americans have very different experiences and histories of discrimination, some scholars have asked whether the fact that both groups are racially marginalized in US society has led to feelings of commonality and solidarity with each other (Jones-Correa et al. 2016; Sanchez 2008). Accordingly, because BLM is framed around issues of racial justice and discrimination, it is conceivable that Latinos may be supportive of this social movement, even though they are not the focus of it. Within the Latino community, however, there are problems of colorism, which is discrimination and bias based on darker skin tones and antiblack sentiments (Hunter 2007; Oboler and Dzidzienyo 2005); thus it is far from a certainty that they would back the BLM movement. In fact, some previous research has argued that rather than working in coalition, black and brown relations are riddled with conflict and competition (see Marrow, 2011; McClain et al. 2006; Morin et al., 2011).

Notwithstanding the latter body of literature, our results provide some evidence to be more optimistic about black and brown solidarity. Only about 22% of Latinos expressed opposition to the BLM movement, compared with the large plurality (45%) who somewhat to strongly support BLM. Contrary to our findings on greater support of immigrant rights activism by foreign-born respondents, when nativity is considered, a larger percentage (53%) of US-born Latinos support BLM, compared with a still-solid 41% of Latino immigrants whose backing BLM garners. Matched with the other two movements we examined, Latino Republicans expressed the highest degree of opposition to BLM, with about 50% being somewhat to strongly opposed to this movement. Nevertheless, despite BLM's not primarily focusing on what are often considered to be Latino-specific issues (e.g., immigration, bilingual education), a large number of Latinos do in fact support the movement for black lives. Thus, if BLM desires to expand its base and work in coalition with groups beyond the African American community, it seems to have a potential ally in Latinos.

National attitudes toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual people have shifted considerably over time to be more positive and more supportive of policies that expand their rights (Markel and Joslyn 2008). Yet, after the momentous 2008 presidential elections, despite voting overwhelming for Barack Obama, the Latino electorate was criticized for voting in favor of the passage of California's

infamous Proposition 8, which repealed gay marriage in the Golden State.³¹ Prior research has found that their socially conservative politics and the conservative values associated with their religiosity have traditionally decreased Latino support of LGBT rights (Ellison et al. 2011). In light of this prior scholarship, we did not expect Latinos to express high levels of approval of lesbian, gay, and bisexual rights activism. Our survey results, however, show that they are actually quite supportive of contentious politics on behalf of the LGB community.

Only 14% of Latinos expressed any level of opposition to LGB rights activism, in contrast to 42% who said they strongly supported activism in this area. An additional 16% of Latinos indicated they somewhat supported LGB activism. In total then, 58% of Latinos in our sample expressed that they somewhat to strongly support activism for the rights of LGB people. Even more surprising was the degree to which Republican Latinos support this type of contentious politics. Indeed, more Latinos (35%) who identify as Republican support LGB activism than oppose it (31%). In distinction, Latinos who do not identify with the GOP support contentious politics on behalf of the LGB community at over 64%, whereas Latinos born in the United States back this type of activism at a higher rate (62%) compared with a still-solid nearly 46% of foreign-born Latinos.

To summarize, if activists fighting for immigrant, black, and LGB rights in the Trump Era are to be successful, then it is of the utmost importance that they find ways to get the support of politically relevant constituencies, such as Latinos—the nation's largest racial minority group. The results of our survey questions show signs for hope and suggest that this community is strongly supportive of progressive political activism. These findings are important to note not only because they imply that all three of the aforementioned segments of the Resistance—BLM, LGB, and immigrant rights organizers—should invest in seeking the support of Latinos, but also because they suggest that this politically vital community may be open to backing cross-movement and intersectional forms of activism. In the next section we highlight some specific examples of how these types of organizing are already occurring and are all the more vital during this presidency.

Intersectionality and Cross-Movement Solidarity

Because of the Trump administration's simultaneous attacks on various marginalized groups, the president may be creating opportunities for the immigrant rights movement to forge more productive and meaningful intersectional and cross-movement alliances. As such, it is critical to explore the ways in which the immigrant rights movement has engaged in these types of organizing,

because they will become all the more important as long as Trump is in the Oval Office.

Before we discuss these concepts in relation to the immigrant rights movement, it will be useful to distinguish intersectionality, or intersectional activism, from cross-movement solidarity (Ayoub forthcoming). Cross-movement solidarity occurs when independent groups have an overlapping shared interest or grievance that leads these respective groups to work together to achieve a common goal. Examples range from women suffrage and Christian temperance activists uniting in the late 18th and early 20th centuries, to contemporary unions and environmental groups working against corporations (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rose 1999). The critical component here is that these coalitions stem from a shared interest, not shared identities or group membership.

In contrast, intersectionality theory contends that individuals have multiple identities that can produce marginalization, often simultaneously, as in the case of gender and race (Crenshaw 1991; Hancock 2007). In movements, this implies that groups share not only interests, but also identities. As one national activist illustrated, "When Trump won, it became very clear that we were all being attacked by an agenda whose goal was to eliminate difference." Therefore, "As people of color in the U.S., we began to understand that aside from our immigration status, our youth also have to fight against criminalization, the school-to-prison pipeline, in addition to poverty, in addition to neighborhood segregation, etc." Thus, "At the moment our network is facing an organic and real challenge of how to merge all of our other identities with our realities as immigrants."³²

Preceding the election of Donald Trump, the immigrant rights movement already had elements that were intersectional (Terriquez 2015). For example, UWD frames and contextualizes much of its organizing through an explicitly queer lens. They estimate that 86% of their leadership and 43% of their membership identifies as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Queer (LGBTQ). As Cuna explained, "We're all very queer, which is good and beautiful so we can't separate" immigrant from LGBTQ rights. "It's totally an overlap," so "we've created a message about being 'UndocuQueer.'"³³

One of the major components of UWD's organization is their Queer Undocumented Immigrant Project (QUIP). QUIP aims to "transform the immigrant and LGBTQ movements, to adopt an intersectional analysis in their efforts to advance and build power for the rights of both communities."³⁴ The broader UndocuQueer movement, which includes activists across a host of organizations, has specifically centered the intersection of the fight for LGBTQ rights with the struggle for the broader protection of immigrants (Seif 2014). Looking to the future of the movement, it is likely that a major part of its organizing will continue to center on issues that intersect both legal status and sexuality.

Another potential area for both intersectional and cross-movement solidarity is with organizations that focus on racial justice for African Americans. Although immigrant rights activism has traditionally been heavily Latino focused in terms of for whom advocacy is organized and who is involved in it (Zepeda-Millán 2017), there is an increasing broadening of the immigrant rights movement to include other racial and ethnic groups. For instance, the number of black immigrants in the United States is on the rise (Greer 2013), and there may be more mobilization on immigration issues among this community as a result. Groups already organizing on behalf of the rights of black people in the United States, such as BLM and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), have also increasingly discussed and advocated for immigrant rights. As an example, the NAACP recently filed a lawsuit in response to President Trump's ending of the DACA program.³⁵ In addition, BLM also added immigration reform, deportations, and immigrant detention centers to its recent platform, with a specific emphasis on black immigrants.³⁶ BLM may be particularly interested in these issues because one of its co-founders, Opal Tometi, the daughter of Nigerian immigrants, is also a cofounder of the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) and has a long history of activism in the immigrant rights community (Ramshaw 2017). Hence, it may be possible for black and brown organizations to work together in the fight for immigrant rights and that both groups will see not only overlapping interests, but also shared struggles, given the impending risks they face under Trump. Again, our survey data point to the potential of this scenario becoming a reality.

There are also some important opportunities and examples of cross-movement solidarity between women's groups and immigrant rights advocates. For instance, draconian immigration enforcement strategies in the Trump Era, such as ICE agents appearing in court to arrest undocumented women who are the victims of domestic violence (Mettler 2017), place immigrant women and their rights in peril. As a result, these activities have led to more frequent calls by women's rights activists and organizations—such as the National Organization for Women—to frame immigration as a feminist issue.³⁷ Groups such as the National Women's Law Center have also developed resources and called for actions to protect the rights of immigrant women (including their reproductive rights) and have criticized harsh immigration policies for their detrimental effects on foreign-born women's health.³⁸ Moreover, not only did organizers of the historic 2017 Women's March also explicitly declare their oppositions to the federal government's deportation practices, but as Fisher's chapter in this volume (Chapter 5) shows, many of the participants in the national mobilization were also supportive of immigrant rights.³⁹ Thus there may be rich possibilities to bring together a coalition between activism rooted in gender justice and activism on behalf of the rights of the foreign born.

Key bridges to these types of coalitions will undoubtedly be intersectional organizations, such as the National Domestic Workers Alliance, which advocates for domestic workers who are more often than not immigrant women. Both types of groups—mainstream women’s organizations and immigrant women organizations—might see the opportunity, for example, to joining the fight against detention centers, given the fact that Trump plans to expand these forms of prisons where documented cases of rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment against women chronically occur.⁴⁰ In Chapter 5, Fisher demonstrates that some participants in the Women’s March and the People’s Climate March not only reported participation in marches on racial justice and immigration, but also in some instances cited these issues as the main motivator for their participation in the Women’s March and the People’s Climate March. This offers further evidence of how multiple elements of the resistance are rooted in intersectionality and cross-movement solidarity.

The potential political power of coalitions among progressive groups is considerable (Phillips 2016; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Nevertheless, this has consequently led some political elites to try to create conflict and schisms between various groups in order to reduce their ability to create robust and productive alliances. For example, President Trump’s rhetoric has intentionally pitted Latino immigrants against African Americans by signaling that restrictive immigration policies will benefit the latter group who he claims has been negatively impacted by immigrant labor competition (Lockhart 2017). Accordingly, one hurdle moving forward will be for segments of the Resistance to withstand external efforts to frame its various members as in direct competition with one another. However, although our interviews with activists suggest that intersectional framing was already a key component of immigrant rights activism before Trump, we did not find evidence—as a result of the 2016 election—of current cross-sectional or intersectional organizing with groups that are not explicitly linked to immigrant rights activism. Nonetheless, as one of our interviewees stated, “Among the emerging cadre of leaders” in the immigrant rights movement today, “there’s a heightened sensibility of the need to have an intersectional approach to our work.”⁴¹

Conclusions

Our overall goal in this chapter was to take the initial pulse of the immigrant rights movement during the first year of an administration that has shown itself to be both overtly and covertly nativist. One of the difficulties of taking on such a challenge is the fact that by the time this book is published, there will undoubtedly have been further developments in the movement’s strategic and tactical

responses to both the president’s attacks, as well as additional ones that—unfortunately—will surely have followed. In particular, the fate of the Dreamers is still—at this writing—uncertain, between a president who has both revealed nakedly racist views and expressed sympathy for Dreamers, and a movement of undocumented young people that has shown growing political sophistication.⁴² Nevertheless, we believe our contribution to this volume provides some valuable empirical and theoretical insights.

To begin with, our study goes beyond the often-rudimentary understanding of political opportunities as being merely the “flipside” of political threats, in which an increase in the latter results in the reduction of the former (Goldstone and Tilly 2001:181). Our examination of the state of the US immigrant rights movement in the early days of the Trump administration suggests that opportunities and threats interact in dynamic ways, often varying by level of government and by geographic location. Trump’s attacking of immigrants through executive actions and his party’s control of every branch of the federal government have created a highly threatening context and closed the legislative political opportunity structure at the national level. Moreover, some evidence indicates that the president’s hostility toward the foreign born has had local ramifications as well. Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric and actions seem to have emboldened Republican elected officials “who favor stricter immigration enforcement at the local level.”⁴³ Thus, in some places throughout the nation, the immigrant rights movement finds itself operating in an environment of high degrees of national and local threats that have led to closed legislative opportunity structures at these same governing levels. The result is, as one of the activists we quoted earlier put it, that any hope for liberal immigration reform by the federal and many local and state governments is a “pipedream.”

These dim prospects for progressive policy change, however, do not mean that activists have retreated, given up, or both. The state of the immigrant rights movement in several of the previously mentioned types of locations is best described as one of “abeyance.” According to Taylor and Crossley (2013), “hostile political and cultural environments” often create periods of abeyance during which movements sustain themselves by developing “distinct repertoires of contention” that provide “continuity from one stage of mobilization to another” (1). For instance, on top of directly responding to and resisting the president’s immediate attacks against its members, the immigrant rights movement is attempting to expand its base by building its membership in new locations, including traditionally conservative places such as the rural Midwest and the US South.

In contrast, in cities and states with different political and demographic dynamics, the national threat of Trump has created an unexpected opening of political opportunities for activists to push for pro-immigrant local policy reforms

In places like California, for example, immigrant rights organizers are taking advantage of the current political moment to lobby for progressive immigration legislation at the state and local levels for which Democrats are now willing to prove their “pro-immigrant credentials” by directly challenging the federal government (Burciaga and Martinez 2017).

The president’s draconian agenda to “eliminate difference” also seems to have alerted Latinos to the fact that their struggles are intertwined with those of other marginalized segments of American society. As a consequence, our original survey data suggest that Latinos are quite supportive of not only immigrant rights in general, but also of activism on behalf of African Americans and LGB people. This is important to note not only because our findings signal possibilities for cross-movement and intersectional coalition-building, but also because today Latinos are the nation’s largest minority group, and more than 800,000 (more than 66,000 a month) of them turn 18 each year and become potential voters.⁴⁴ Moreover, millennials made up almost half (44%) of the over 27 million Latinos eligible to cast a ballot in 2016 (Krogstad et al. 2016), and the vast majority of Latino millennials backed an openly socialist candidate—Bernie Sanders—during the Democratic primaries.⁴⁵ This means that the largest minority group in the country will become an increasingly progressive and important electoral force to be reckoned with in American politics. Consequently, given the high levels of support for activism of various sorts among immigrant and US-born Latinos, the Resistance against Donald Trump would be wise to invest in reaching out to and working in alliance with this politically critical constituency.

Climate of Resistance

How the Climate Movement Connected to the Resistance

DANA R. FISHER

On President Donald Trump’s 100th day in office, Americans took to the streets once again to protest the policies of his administration. This time, participants joined the 2017 People’s Climate March to express their concerns about the environmental agenda of the Trump Administration. This event marked the second People’s Climate March. The previous event took place on the Sunday before the United Nations held talks on the issue of climate change in New York City in September 2014.

Although this event was explicitly intended to build on the momentum of the People’s Climate March, it got folded into the resurgence of public forms of social expression such as protests and street demonstrations that have taken place since the inauguration of Donald Trump. Because the Women’s March mobilized almost three-million people across the country (see Chapter 3), large-scale protest events have taken place around a variety of causes including racial justice; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Queer (LGBTQ) rights; the Trump Administration’s perceived stance on science, and climate change.¹ This chapter looks at how the climate movement has connected to the Resistance.

As Meyer and Tarrow note in their Introduction, demonstrations are part of a much larger repertoire of contention employed by social movements.² Large-scale events mobilize substantial numbers of people to participate and, as such, have been the focus of much scholarly inquiry. Accordingly, this chapter builds on the research that compares large-scale protest events,³ studying how the climate movement has connected with the Resistance. First, I compare the 2017 People’s Climate March (PCM17), which was held on President Trump’s 100th day in office, with the 2014 People’s Climate March (PCM14) to assess how the movement has changed in the past 3 years. Then, I compare the PCM17 with the